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Abstract
This study examines whether criminal suspects facing more severe punishments
are more likely to go to trial. Sample selection makes it difficult to obtain valid
proxies for severity; for instance, I expect severity to be positively related to the
prosecutor’s decision to indict, to indict in federal court (versus state court),
and to try the suspect. Theoretical and empirical findings indicate that in samples
containing only indicted, convicted, or tried suspects, reasonable proxies for
severity may be negatively related to actual severity. The assignment of defen-
dants to judges randomizes the severity of punishment in a manner that is
unrelated to sample selection. Thus, by examining the effect of these assign-
ments, I find that a 10-month increase in prison sentences raises trial rates by
1 percentage point.
1. Introduction
In the United States, trials are adversarial: opposing parties acquire and present
evidence, while impartial judges and juries decide the outcome of the dispute.
However, most cases are settled without a trial. For civil cases, federal judges
are actively encouraged to participate in negotiations among litigants and thus
influence settlement outcomes (Galanter 1986). For criminal cases, federal judges
are not allowed to play any role in plea negotiations or make any comments
that might indirectly influence the bargaining process (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11[c][1]).
However, the reputations of federal judges may indirectly affect negotiations; for
instance, defendants may be more willing to plead guilty if they are assigned to
judges reputed to be favorable to prosecutors.
Prior to the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing
guidelines, federal judges had almost complete discretion over sentencing. Thus,
prosecutors saw their role as securing convictions (Stuntz 1997; Simons 2009).
Mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing-guidelines laws shifted some of
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the sentencing authority from judges to prosecutors. For instance, prosecutors can
charge a defendant with possessing a gun while selling drugs, which is punished
by a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence on top of the drug-trafficking sentence,
while declining to file gun charges for identical defendants. The lack of judicial
supervision over charging decisions thus gives prosecutors considerable power
over sentencing (Vorenberg 1981).
Judges and scholars have recommended that prosecutors alter their role as
adversaries with respect to sentencing and instead seek just outcomes. In par-
ticular, some scholars advocate that prosecutors ensure that similar defendants
be punished similarly (Green 1999; Simons 2009).1 In this paper, I provide
evidence that prosecutors seek harsher penalties against defendants who are
assigned to harsher judges. This evidence suggests that prosecutors act as ad-
versaries in sentencing decisions rather than seek similar penalties for defendants
who commit similar crimes.
To reach these conclusions, I note that if prosecutors seek to punish similar
defendants similarly, they will make their plea offers independent of the judge
assigned to the case. Consequently, defendants find their plea offers more at-
tractive and are less likely to go to trial when they are assigned to harsher judges.
In contrast, prosecutors who act as adversaries offer longer sentences to defen-
dants assigned to harsher judges.
I define a judge as harsh if defendants receive longer prison sentences when
assigned to that judge compared to other judges in the same courthouse and
year. I find that defendants are 1 percentage point more likely to go to trial
when they are assigned to a judge who is 10 months harsher. This evidence
contradicts the hypothesis that prosecutors seek equitable sentences. Further, the
magnitude of this effect is large since only 9 percent of defendants go to trial.
Prior work has shown that the length of prison sentences varies significantly
among federal judges (Anderson, Kling, and Stith 1999; LaCasse and Payne 1999).
For instance, judges differ in sentencing, in the evidence that they allow at trial
over a hearsay objection, and in whether they allow particular expert testimony.
Earlier studies found that judge assignments do not affect trial rates (Ashenfelter,
Eisenberg, and Schwab 1995; LaCasse and Payne 1999). However, these studies
lack statistical power since they are based on only two or three districts and
include a different dummy variable for each judge.2 In contrast, Waldfogel (1995)
assumes that differences among judges can be summarized by a single parameter
and finds that judges who have higher percentages of their cases go to trial also
have higher rates of defendant wins. Waldfogel (1995) examines civil cases; thus,
his results are not applicable to criminal cases.
If prosecutors do not seek uniform sentences, then my empirical estimates
allow me to quantify the effect of increasing prison sentences on the adminis-
1 In contrast, Easterbrook (1983) remarks that if deterrence is the only goal of criminal law, then
prosecutors should not seek similar penalties for similar defendants.
2 Anderson, Kling, and Stith (1999) look at more districts but do not examine the decision to go
to trial.
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tration of criminal justice. This is important because scholars and practitioners
have expressed concerns that the severe sentences required by the U.S. Federal
Sentencing Guidelines discourage defendants from accepting plea bargains and
lead to more trials than the criminal justice system can handle. Conversely,
scholars have argued that death penalty statutes may save resources by making
it more likely for defendants to plea-bargain rather than go to trial and face the
threat of execution.3 Given that trials take priority over other activities, higher
trial rates reduce the amount of time that prosecutors spend on other valuable
activities.4
Prior empirical work provides contradictory evidence on the effect of pun-
ishment severity on the likelihood that a case goes to trial.5 Some of these
empirical findings can be criticized because they use the prison sentence at trial
as a proxy for severity. However, cases that go to trial are not representative of
the set of litigated cases, and thus prison sentences at trial are endogenous (Priest
and Klein 1984). Other empirical studies use characteristics of the offense for
indicted defendants as proxies for punishment severity. These proxies can also
lead to specious conclusions, as illustrated in the following example.
In my example, two defendants are indicted in federal court for trafficking
heroin: the first defendant is accused of trafficking 1 gram of heroin, while the
second is accused of trafficking 50 grams. Without any other aggravating cir-
cumstance, the first defendant faces a 15- to 21-month prison sentence, while
the second faces a 33- to 41-month sentence. Federal authorities prosecute the
worst offenders; thus, it is unlikely that the first defendant is suspected solely
of trafficking 1 gram of heroin. However, I assume in my example that individuals
accused of trafficking 50 grams are indicted even absent any aggravating cir-
cumstance.
Specifically, I assume that the first defendant carried a gun, while the second
did not. Thus, the defendant with 1 gram faces a longer prison sentence than
the defendant with 50 grams, since possession of a gun adds a minimum of 5
years to the prison sentence. Of course, the defendant with 50 grams of heroin
could also have carried a gun. However, prosecutors’ decisions regarding which
3 Concerns that the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines would increase the number of trials are
discussed in Cohen (1991), Karle and Sager (1991), and Sisk, Heise, and Morriss (1998), while the
expectation that death penalty statutes decrease the number of plea bargains is discussed in Kuziemko
(2006) and Cook (2009).
4 For instance, between October 1994 and September 1995, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York disposed of 1,048 criminal cases. Of these cases, 93 were disposed by trial. Over
the same period, the Southern District of New York spent 1,252 attorney working hours on district
court activity and 1,023 attorney working hours on witness preparation (U.S. Department of Justice,
response to author’s Freedom of Information Act request for 1993–98Department of Justice personnel
data, September 20, 1999). Thus, a 1-percentage-point increase in the number of cases disposed by
trial increases the number of trials in that district by 11 percent and has a significant negative effect
on the activities of that district.
5 Elder (1989), Snyder (1990), and Boylan and Long (2005) provide evidence that more severe
cases are more likely to go to trial. Bjerk (2005) and Kuziemko (2006) find that severity does not
affect the likelihood that a case goes to trial. Landes (1971) reaches different conclusions in the two
samples that he examines.
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defendants to indict make it more likely that the defendant with 1 gram of heroin
possessed a gun. Thus, it is conceivable that the average prison sentence of
indicted defendants with 1 gram of heroin is longer than the average prison
sentence of defendants with 50 grams of heroin. In Section 2, I examine all
federal drug-trafficking defendants between 1994 and 2008 for whom I have
information on the weight of the heroin involved in the case. Consistent with
my example, I find that the weight of the heroin is negatively correlated with
the prison sentence received by defendants. Thus, the weight of the heroin is a
very poor proxy for the expected prison sentence faced by a heroin trafficker
when I do not control for other characteristics of the offense (for example,
possession of a gun).
When the researcher does not observe all aspects of the crime, he or she may
obtain incorrect estimates of the effect of punishment severity on the likelihood
that a case goes to trial. In my example, the defendant with 1 gram of heroin
pleads guilty to trafficking, and in exchange the prosecutor does not file gun
charges. Thus, the researcher does not know that the defendant with 1 gram of
heroin possessed a gun. This example is not far-fetched, since gun charges are
often dropped as part of a plea agreement (Nagel and Schulhofer 1992).6 Suppose
further that the defendant with 50 grams of heroin is convicted at trial. Then
the researcher incorrectly concludes that the defendant with 1 gram committed
the less severe crime and thus that the defendant who committed the less severe
crime agreed to plea-bargain.
Note in my example that the defendant with 1 gram of heroin is sentenced
to a shorter prison sentence than the defendant with 50 grams. However, I can
easily modify this example to ensure that the weight of the heroin is negatively
correlated with the prison sentence. For instance, I can include several additional
defendants with 1 gram of heroin who possessed a gun. Unlike the first defendant,
these additional defendants are convicted at trial of trafficking heroin and pos-
sessing a gun. In this more complicated example, the average prison sentence
for individuals with 1 gram of heroin is higher than the average prison sentence
for individuals with 50 grams. Further, individuals with 1 gram of heroin are
still more likely to plea-bargain than individuals with 50 grams. Finally, presence
of a gun is a very good predictor of whether a case goes to trial. However, the
relation is not causal since in my example gun charges are observed only in
cases that go to trial.
In Section 3 I describe a theoretical model for the selection of cases that
prosecutors decline, try, and plea-bargain. The expected prison sentence at trial
(severity) is the sum of two terms: the characteristics of the crime that are always
observed by the researcher (observed severity) and the characteristics of the
crime that are unobserved for an endogenous subset of observations (unobserved
6 Thus, the researcher observes whether the prosecutor included the gun charges in the indictment
but does not observe whether the prosecutor could have included the charges but decided not to
do so in exchange for the defendant pleading guilty of drug trafficking.
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severity). In my example, the weight of the heroin was always observed, while
the presence of a gun was not observed for the first defendant as part of the
plea agreement. I show in my theoretical model that case selection can lead to
a negative correlation between observed severity and the expected prison sentence
at trial. This theoretical result is consistent with my empirical evidence that the
weight of the heroin is negatively correlated with the prison sentence. Thus, my
empirical evidence and my theoretical model indicate that the selection of cases
to prosecute can make proxies for severity invalid. Prior empirical work provides
contradictory evidence on the effect of punishment severity on the likelihood
that a case goes to trial. One explanation for these contradictory findings is that
case selection makes the proxies for severity unreliable.
There are other explanations for the contradictory empirical evidence on the
effect of punishment severity on the expected prison sentence at trial. For in-
stance, a defendant may be able to trade information about other cases in ex-
change for a reduced sentence. Thus, a defendant who traffics a large amount
of heroin may be able to obtain a more lenient prison sentence because he or
she has more valuable information to trade. This could explain my empirical
finding that the weight of the heroin is negatively correlated with the prison
sentence. For some crimes, the individuals charged with more serious offenses
may have more information to trade and are more likely to plea-bargain, while
for other crimes, the relation could be reversed. Consequently, to estimate
whether trials are more frequent when penalties are more severe, I need an
instrument for severity—namely, a variable that is correlated with the expected
prison sentence for a defendant but uncorrelated with the cost of going to trial,
the likelihood that the defendant is guilty, the strength of the evidence, the ability
of the defendant to provide information in other cases, and sample selection.
Judge assignments are a valid instrument for severity, since defendants are ran-
domly assigned to judges after prosecutors decide to indict a suspect and since
judges vary in their severity. Section 5 provides empirical evidence that when
defendants are assigned harsher judges, they are more likely to go to trial and
to plead to longer prison sentences.
2. Example of the Effect of Case Selection
I present two empirical examples of how case selection affects the validity of
proxies for severity. In the first example, I have data for all arrests, including
arrests that did not lead to an indictment. This example illustrates how the
severity of the crime may not be a good predictor for the expected prison sentence
received by a defendant. In the second example, I do not have data on decli-
nations. However, I show that the natural proxy for case severity is negatively
related to the average prison sentence received by defendants. One explanation
for this finding is that excluding cases that are declined corrupts the proxy for
severity.
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2.1. State Cases
I examine data on 450 suspects arrested for assault in Portland, Oregon, in
1982 and 1986 (Abt Associates 1987; Boland 2004) because this data set includes
all felony arrests, including all cases declined for prosecution. I divide assaults
into first-, second-, and third-degree assault. First-degree assault requires the
physical injury to have been serious, intentional, and caused by a dangerous
weapon, while second- and third-degree assault require, respectively, two or one
of these conditions to be present.
Figure 1 shows the average prison sentences (in months) and trial rates for
first-, second-, and third-degree assault. If more severe cases go to trial, then
first-degree assault would be most likely to be tried, while in our data the reverse
is true. One explanation for this finding is that there are other factors that affect
the likelihood of a trial and that these factors are correlated with the severity of
the offense and the selection of cases to prosecute. Consistent with this expla-
nation, when I examine all suspects, individuals arrested for third-degree assault
receive the highest average prison sentences, while when I examine suspects in
cases that are not declined, individuals arrested for first-degree assault receive
the highest average prison sentence.7
2.2. Federal Cases
Next, I examine federal drug trafficking cases for the years 1994–2008 (U.S.
Department of Justice 2009). I restrict my sample to observations for 8,587 indicted
defendants for which I have information about the weight of the heroin involved
in the case. The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines made the weight of the drug
one of the most important factors in determining the prison sentence. For this
reason, in their study of the determinants of trial rates, Boylan and Long (2005)
take the weight of the drug as the main proxy for the severity in the case. Figure
2 displays actual prison sentences as a function of the weight of the heroin. For
better readability, the graph was smoothed using locally weighted regression. Prison
sentences are shorter when the weight of the heroin is greater.8 This finding can
be explained by the theoretical results that I present next, namely, that average
severity in truncated samples of indicted defendants can be negatively correlated
with average severity in nontruncated samples of suspects.
3. Model
I model two important sample selection problems. First, cases that go to trial
are not representative of the set of litigated cases. In 2004, 96 percent of defen-
7 The differences in prison sentences for first-, second-, and third-degree manslaughter are statis-
tically insignificant. However, in both of my samples, the differences in the trial rates between second-
degree and first-degree assault cases are statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level.
8 This is not the case for all drugs. For marijuana and crack cocaine, the prison sentences are
strongly increasing in the weight of the drug.
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Figure 1. Average prison sentences and average trial rates for all suspects (left) and excluding
suspects for whom charges were declined (right).
dants convicted of felony offenses pleaded guilty to their charges (U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice 2006). Thus, prison sentences at trial are endogenous and cannot
proxy for offense severity. Second, indicted defendants are not representative of
the set of suspects referred to prosecutors. In 2004, prosecutors declined to
prosecute 21.5 percent of suspects (U.S. Department of Justice 2006). Thus, the
observed characteristics of the defendant are endogenous and cannot proxy for
offense severity.
I present theoretical results that characterize the relation between sample se-
lection, observed characteristics of the suspect, and outcomes. In the Appendix,
the criminal process is described as a game between a defendant and a prosecutor
in a manner similar to Reingenaum (1988). The following notation is used: is˜S
the severity of the punishment before indictment, is the severity after˜S p S w
indictment, d is the probability that a suspect is guilty, and aS is the expected
prison sentence for an innocent defendant who goes to trial. Proposition A1
states that in equilibrium there are scalars and such thatS S
i) if , the prosecutor declines to indict the suspect,˜S ! S
ii) if and , the prosecutor indicts the suspect, the expected prison˜S 1 S S ! S
sentence for the suspect is aS, and the probability of a trial is 0, and
iii) if and , the prosecutor indicts the suspect, the expected prison˜S 1 S S 1 S
sentence for the suspect is , and the probability of a trial is .dS (1 d)aS 1 d
The first consequence of proposition A1 is that exclusion restrictions are
unlikely to be valid if I simultaneously estimate the prison sentence received by
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Figure 2. Prison sentences and heroin weight
a suspect and whether the suspect is tried. Specifically, any proxy for case severity
affects both the likelihood of trial and the prison sentence.9
The second consequence of proposition A1 is that individuals accused of more
severe offenses are more likely to be indicted. Thus, the observed severity among
indicted defendants is endogenous. Specifically, suppose the severity of the pun-
ishment before indictment, , can be decomposed into two independent com-˜S
ponents: an observed component o and an unobserved component u. Then,
individuals are indicted if or, alternatively, if . Therefore,˜S p o u 1 S u 1 S o
unobserved severity is decreasing in observed severity.
In Boylan and Long’s (2005) study of the determinants of trial rates, observed
severity is the weight and type of the drug. However, Section 2.2 demonstrates
that in federal heroin cases, the weight of the drug is negatively correlated with
the expected prison sentence. Thus, among indicted defendants, severity ˜S p
is negatively correlated with observed severity o. Thus, an additional dis-o u
tributional assumption is needed to be able to find the relation between the
severity of the offense and trial rates.
Proposition 1 characterizes conditions under which observed severity is pos-
itively correlated with trial rates and prison sentences.
Proposition 1
i) Suppose that severity before indictment is , severity after in-˜S p o u
dictment is , and u and w are independent. Then, in a subgame perfect˜S p S w
9 The same is true for trial costs that affect and thus affect both the likelihood of trial and theS
prison sentence.
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equilibrium, cases with a higher observed severity (o) are more likely to go to
trial and have longer average prison sentences.
ii) Suppose that severity before indictment is , severity after in-˜S p o u
dictment is , and u and w are independent. Then, in a subgame perfect˜S p S w
equilibrium, if the distribution of unobserved severity (u) satisfies the monotone
likelihood ratio property, indicted defendants with a higher observed severity
(o) have longer average prison sentences and higher trial rates.
iii) Suppose that severity before indictment is , severity after in-˜S p o u
dictment is , and u and w are independent. Then, in a subgame perfect˜S p S w
equilibrium, for some distributions of unobserved severity (u), indicted defen-
dants with higher observed severity (o) have shorter average prison sentences.
iv) Suppose that severity before indictment is , severity after in-˜S p o u
dictment is , and u and w are independent. Then, in a subgame perfect˜S p S w
equilibrium, indicted defendants with higher postindictment severity (w) have
longer average prison sentences and higher trial rates, but they need not have
longer average prison sentences at trial.
Proof
i) First, I fix w. Note that satisfies condition a in lemma A1. Thus, the˜S
probability of trial conditional on w and o is increasing in o, and consequently
the probability of trial conditional on o is also increasing in o. Let be˜f(S, w)
the expected prison sentence; namely,
˜0 if S ≤ S
D D˜ ˜P(S, w) p aS T  A if S 1 S and S 1 S{ D D ˜d(S T  A ) (1 d)aS if S 1 S and S 1 S.
Since P is increasing in , by lemma A1, the expected prison sentence conditional˜S
on o and w is increasing in o. Therefore, the expected prison sentence conditional
on o is increasing in o.
ii) By lemmas A3 and A4, the probability density of conditional on the case˜S
not being dismissed satisfies condition a in lemma A1. Thus, I can prove the
result the same way that I did in part i.
iii) Suppose that u is distributed according to the Student’s t distribution with
2 degrees of freedom; namely, u has a density
3/2
1
g(u) p .
2( )2 u
Then,
˜ ˜E[SFS 1 S] p o E[uFu 1 S o]
p o (S o) 2 S o
p S 2 S o,
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and thus the expected prison sentence conditional on the case not being declined
is decreasing in observed severity o.
iv) By lemma A1, the trial rates and the expected prison sentence are increasing
in w. To simplify the notation, assume that , , and u has a densityo p 0 S S 1 w
3/2
1
g(u) p .
2( )2 u
Then, the expected prison sentence at trial for indicted cases
˜ ˜ ˜E[S wFS 1 S and S 1 S] p E[u wFu 1 S w]
p w (S w) 2 S w
is decreasing in w. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 provides three methods by which to examine whether criminal
suspects who face more severe punishment are more likely to go to trial. First,
I can assume that severity is independently distributed from other characteristics
that affect the likelihood of a trial and examine the set of all suspects (proposition
1.i). Second, I can assume that severity is independently distributed from other
characteristics that affect the likelihood of a trial and that the distribution of
unobserved severity satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (proposition
1.ii).10 Third, I can use an instrument for severity w that is uncorrelated with
sample selection (proposition 1.iv). I follow the third method and use the random
assignment of defendants to judges as my instrument w.
4. Empirical Framework
I estimate two sets of regressions. In the first set of regressions, I seek to
determine whether defendants are more likely to go to trial when they are
assigned to harsher judges. Thus, the unit of observation is the defendant, and
I proxy the harshness of judge j in year t by the average prison sentence for all
defendants assigned to judge j in year t. When I regress the likelihood of a plea
on the proxy for severity, I expect a downward bias in my estimates since the
severity of the judge is observed with error. I can, however, obtain consistent
estimates by two-stage least squares regression, where the instrument for severity
is the average prison sentence for defendants assigned to judge j in other years.
I provide below conditions for which my procedure gives consistent estimates;
namely, within a particular courthouse and year, defendants must be randomly
assigned to judges.
In the second set of regressions, I examine whether defendants plead to longer
prison sentences when they are assigned to judges who are harsher at trial. Let
10 Roosen and Hennessy (2004) provide a statistical test for whether a distribution satisfies the
monotone likelihood ratio property.
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be the prison sentence that defendant i receives if the case goes to trial, and1Yi
let be the prison sentence that defendant i receives in a plea. Further, let0Yi
be the judge assigned to defendant i. I seek to estimatej (i)
0 1Y p gY  u .i i i
Since both trial and plea sentences cannot be observed for a particular defendant,
the average prison sentence for cases that go to trial assigned to judge j p j(i)
in year t, is my proxy for . Similarly, the average prison sentence for plea1 1Y Yijt
cases assigned to judge in year t, , is my proxy for . Let be the0 0 ˆj p j(i) Y Y gjt i
coefficient obtained when regressing on . The coefficient does not provide0 1 ˆY Y gjt jt
consistent estimates for g because the trial sentences affect which cases are
concluded by trial. However, I am able to bound ; specifically, I show thatg
.gˆ ! g
4.1. Likelihood of a Plea
For simplicity, I consider a linearized version of my model, examine only one
courthouse, and assume that each judge is assigned to n defendants per year.
For a defendant i, is the year, is the assigned judge, is the harshnesst(i) j(i) wj(i)
of the judge, and is severity, where for some vector ,S gi
S p w  go  u .i j(i) i i
Let be nonharshness judge-specific characteristics that affect the likelihoodhj(i)
of a trial. Then, the probability of trial and the prison sentence are
P p aS  h  i i j(i) i
and
Y p bS  d ,i i i
where and are independently and identically distributed zero mean variables. di i
By construction, is orthogonal to . I assume that defendants are ran-w hj(i) j(i)
domly assigned to judges; specifically, is orthogonal to ,[w ,h ] (o , u ,  , d )j(i) j(i) i i i i
and is orthogonal to when .(o , u ,  , d ) (o , u ,  , d ) j(i) p j(l)i i i i l l l l
Since I do not observe , I proxy with the average prison sentence forw wj(i) j(i)
judge in year . For any variable , let be the average value of X forj(i) t(i) X Xi i
the other defendants assigned to judge in year ; namely,j(i) t(i)
 XkkIi
X p ,i  1kIi
where
I p {k ( i: j(k) p j(i) and t(k)t(i)}.i
Then the average prison sentence for the other cases assigned to judge isj(i)
, whereYi
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Y p b(w  go  u ) gd ,j(i)i i i i
or, alternatively,
1 1
S p Y  go  u  d  go  u .i i ii i i ib b
Thus, when I use as a proxy for , I obtainY Sii
a
P p Y  n , (1)i iib
where
a
n p ago  au  d  ago  au    h .i i i i j(i)i i ib
Denote by the covariance matrix for o, and the variance of u and d,2 2S j jo u d
and n the number of defendants assigned to judge . Then,j(i)
a a a′ 2 2cov(Y , n ) p gSg  j  j .i o u di n n b(n 1)
In general, I expect great variation in unobserved severity across defendants;
namely, I expect to be very large. So, even for relatively large values of n,2ju
, and thus I expect the ordinary least squares estimate of equationcov(Y , n ) ( 0ii
(1) to be inconsistent.
Instrumental variables estimation can be used to remedy the inconsistency
arising from the error in variables, where the instrument for the average prison
sentence for defendants assigned to a particular judge is its value in the previous
year. Specifically, for any variable , is the average value of X for casesX Xi i,t(i)1
assigned to judge in year ; namely,j(i) t(i) 1
 XkkIi,t(i)1
X p ,i,t(i)1  1kIi,t(i)1
where
I p {k:j(k) p j(i) and t(k) p t(i) 1}.
The instrument for judge severity is , whereYi,t(i)1
Y p (bw  go  u ) dj(i),t1i,t(i)1 i,t(i)1 i,t(i)1 i,t(i)1
and
cov(Y , n ) p 0.i,t(i)1 i
4.2. Plea Sentences
For simplicity, I consider the case in which there is only one courthouse, 1
year, and K judges, and each judge is assigned to n defendants per year. This
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includes the case in which there are multiple years and courthouses if I interpret
each variable as the deviation from the courthouse-year mean. So, for instance,
with multiple courthouses and years, the prison sentence of defendant i is in-
terpreted as the difference between the actual sentence and the mean prison
sentence in the same courthouse and year.
I write severity as
S p w  u ,i j(i) i
where , , and . Let if defendant i is2 2E[w ] p 0 E[uFw] p 0 E[u Fw] p j T p 1j i i i
tried, and let if defendant i pleads. The probability that defendant i isT p 0i
tried is
P p aSi i
and . Thus,a 1 0
2E[u PFj(i) p j] p aj 1 0,i i
2E[u (1 P)Fj(i) p j] p aj ! 0,i i
E[uw PFj(i) p j] p E[E[u PFw, j(i) p j]w ]i j i i i j
p E[E[u PFw, j(i) p j]w ]i i j
2p aj E[w ] p 0,j
and
E[uw (1 P)Fj(i) p j] p E[E[u (1 P)Fw, j(i) p j]w ]i j i i i j
2p aj E[w ] p 0.j
For any variable , let be the average value of X for the cases assigned toTX Xi j
judge j with ; namely,T(i) p T
 XT iiIjTX p ,j  1TiIj
where
TI p {i:j(i) p j and T(i) p T}.j
Then,
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1E[u ] p E[uFT p 1 and j(i) p j]j i i
E[u PFj(i) p j]i ip 1 0,
E[PFj(i) p j]i
0E[u ] p E[uFT p 0 and j(i) p j]j i i
E[u (1 P)Fj(i) p j]i ip ! 0,
E[(1 P)Fj(i) p j]i
1E[wu ] p E[uwFT p 1 and j(i) p j]j j i j i
E[uw PFj(i) p j]i j ip p 0,
E[PFj(i) p j]i
and
0E[wu ] p E[uwFT p 0 and j(i) p j]j j i j i
E[uw (1 P)Fj(i) p j]i j ip p 0.
E[1 PFj(i) p j]i
I assume that the prison sentence received by defendant i is
S if T p 1i iY p {i gS if T p 0.i i
Note that
1 2 2 1 1 2E[Y ] p E[(w )  2wu  (u ) ]j j j j j
and
0 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 2E[Y Y ] p gE[(w )  w (u  u ) u u ] ! gE[Y ] ,j j j j j j jt j j
since and . Thus, for large1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2E[wu ] p E[wu ] p 0 E[u u ] p E[u ]E[u ] ! E[(u ) ]j j j j j j j j jt
values of n,
0 1 Y Yj jj
gˆ p ! g.
1 2 (Y )jjt
5. Judge Assignments
5.1. Sample
All felony cases in U.S. district courts are assigned to judges appointed for
life by the president. For each case, the Transactional Records Access Clearing-
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house provides the name of the judge, investigative agency, offense, conviction,
and prison sentence.11 I examined defendants for the fiscal years 1992–2002 in
32 federal judicial districts.12 I restrict my analysis to drug and violent crimes
because they present a large and relatively homogenous type of case.13
In most federal courts, a court clerk assigns cases randomly to judges. Random
assignment is implemented to prevent judge shopping and to ensure fairness.
According to the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary (U.S. Congress 1998,
p. 67), “all federal districts have rules that require the random assignment of
cases.” I identified several examples of districts with multiple courthouses in
which local rules specify random assignment within the courthouse rather than
at the district level.14 For this reason, I assume that cases are randomly assigned
to judges within a courthouse instead of within a district (the same assumption
was made by Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback [1999]).
Because the random assignment is important for my analysis, for each court-
house I estimate a multinomial logit model in which the dependent variables
are characteristics of the case (for example, involves multiple defendants or was
investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration), while the explanatory
variables are the judge assigned to the case and year fixed effects. I exclude from
my analysis courthouses for which the likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis
that the characteristics of the case have no effect on the identity of the judge.15
To ensure convergence of the maximum likelihood algorithm, I do not include
courthouses with fewer than 300 drug defendants and judges with fewer than
25 drug defendants. Even though the overall sample is large, there are few
observations for a particular judge-year-offense. For this reason, I use the small-
sample distribution of the likelihood ratio test computed with a permutation
11 See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, TRACfed: A Unique Source of Authoritative
Information about the Federal Government’s Enforcement (http://tracfed.syr.edu/).
12 I examined the following districts: middle Alabama, northern Alabama, southern Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, central California, southern California, eastern California, northern California, Col-
orado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Delaware, northern Florida, southern Florida, middle
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, southern Illinois, northern Indiana, southern Indiana, Kansas, eastern Ken-
tucky, western Louisiana, northern Mississippi, southern Mississippi, eastern New York, southern
New York, Utah, northern West Virginia, western Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
13 Violent crimes include bank robberies, civil rights and racial violence, domestic violence, and
weapons violations. The other main types of criminal cases in federal courts are immigration and
white-collar crimes.
14 The U.S. district courts include the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (2008), U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California (2008), U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Florida (2008), U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (2008), U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky (2008), U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan (2008), U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (2008), U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (2008), U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee (2008), U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (1978), U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Texas (2008), and U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
(2008).
15 Often, in cases with multiple defendants, all defendants are assigned to the same judge. Thus,
defendants are not randomly assigned, even though cases may be randomly assigned to judges. I
avoid this complication by treating defendants in a multiple-defendant case as one defendant.
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sampling method based on selecting 1,000 random samples (the method used
in Abrams, Bertrand, and Mullainathan [2011]).
At the 10 percent confidence level, I reject the random-assignment hypothesis
in the following courthouses: Birmingham (Alabama), East St. Louis (Illinois),
Indianapolis (Indiana), Montgomery (Alabama), Salt Lake City (Utah), Talla-
hassee (Florida), and Tucson (Arizona). Thus, the remainder of the analysis
excludes these courthouses and courthouses with fewer than 300 defendants.
5.2. Summary Statistics and Results
My sample consists of drug and violent offenders in the courthouses that
randomly assign defendants to judges, namely, the courthouses listed in Table
1 for which . Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used inp 1 .1
the regressions. Of the 73,155 cases, 83 percent are concluded through a plea
agreement, 9 percent are concluded through trial, and 9 percent are dismissed.
To reduce the influence of outliers, I top coded prison sentences at 360 months.
Consistent with the hypothesis that more severe cases go to trial, the average
prison sentence for cases that go to trial is much higher than for cases concluded
by plea (141 versus 55 months). There is also great variability in defendants’
sentences (SD p 72) and in average prison sentences for a particular judge and
year (SD p 28).
Except for the inclusion of courthouse-year fixed effects, I consider the same
model as in Section 4.1; namely, the unit of observation is a defendant i assigned
to judge j in courthouse c and year t, and the probability of trial (in percentages)
is as follows:
Probability of Trial p aJudge Severity  w  n ,ict jt ct it
where the primary explanatory variable, Judge Severity, is the average prison
sentence (in months) for the other cases assigned to a judge in a particular year,
are courthouse-year dummy variables, and is the error term.w nct it
I expect downward bias in the ordinary least squares estimates of becauseaˆ
my proxy for severity is measured with error. For this reason, I also estimate
the regressions by the two-stage least squares method with the following instru-
ments: the average prison sentence for cases assigned to judge j in other years
and an indicator for whether judge j has prosecutorial experience (see the dis-
cussion in Section 4.1). I expect the observations to be correlated if there are
other judge-specific factors that affect the probability of trial but are not ac-
counted for by severity. To account for this possibility, I cluster standard errors
at the judge level.
To determine whether my model is properly specified, I regress the prison
sentence received by a defendant on judge severity. If the model is correctly
specified, the regression results should imply that a defendant receives a sentence
with an additional month in prison when assigned to a judge whose sentences
are 1 month longer. The results are summarized in the top of Table 3. The
ordinary least squares coefficient for judge severity is statistically insignificant.
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Table 1
Random Assignment of Cases to Judges (p-Values)
Courthouse Large Sample Simulated Sample Size Judges
Anchorage .26 .28 214 3
Biloxi .36 .37 276 2
Birmingham .03 .05 982 8
Brooklyn .33 .35 4,026 15
Cheyenne .65 .66 168 2
Denver .55 .55 1,162 7
East St. Louis .03 .04 572 6
Fort Lauderdale .18 .17 1,110 5
Fresno .29 .31 248 3
Hammond .69 .71 666 2
Honolulu .55 .57 846 5
Indianapolis .03 .03 612 5
Jackson .38 .41 439 3
Kansas City .85 .86 138 4
Lexington .20 .21 282 2
Los Angeles .52 .58 2,307 28
Macon .12 .13 542 3
Miami .12 .14 4,952 17
Mobile .86 .88 1,067 3
Montgomery .02 .03 128 3
New York .21 .28 2,201 30
Pensacola .46 .46 704 2
Phoenix .75 .80 1,180 8
Sacramento .57 .59 473 5
Salt Lake City .00 .00 742 8
San Diego .51 .53 8,065 12
San Francisco .75 .85 175 8
Santa Ana .61 .62 276 3
South Bend .29 .36 60 2
Tallahassee .03 .03 464 3
Tucson .10 .10 3,564 5
Washington .55 .68 1,522 17
West Palm Beach .57 .63 692 3
Wichita .55 .57 398 3
Note. For each courthouse, a multinomial logit regression estimates the probability that a drug case involves
multiple defendants, as a function of judge indicators. The p-values shown are for a test that the judge
indicators are zero under the large-sample distribution and a small-sample distribution obtained according
to 1,000 random samples from the data. Similar values are obtained when the dependent variable is the
probability that the case is investigated by the Drug Enforcement Agency.
Thus, it is important to control for the error-in-variables problem. When I
reestimate the model by two-stage least squares regression, I find that defendants
receive prison sentences that are 1.04 months longer when they are assigned to
judges who give sentences that are harsher by 1 month. I cannot reject the
hypothesis that the two-stage least squares coefficient is one, and thus I cannot
reject the hypothesis that my model is correctly specified.16
16 The F-test has a value of 1.1 and a p-value of .3.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Prison sentence (months) 58.20 72.1 0 360 71,170
If plea (months) 54.88 59.4 0 360 58,741
If trial (months) 140.99 123.6 0 360 6,359
Iff trial conviction (months) 169.74 116.2 0 360 5,282
Judge-year average prison sentence (Judge Severity) 57.55 29.7 0 360 73,382
Judge-(other years) average prison sentence 58.42 25.5 19 136 73,334
Judge with prosecutorial experience .53 .5 0 1 73,408
Plea (100 if plea, 0 otherwise) 83.26 37.3 0 100 73,155
Trial (100 if trial, 0 otherwise) 8.78 28.3 0 100 73,155
Judges’ average trial rate (%) 9.33 5.7 0 43 73,408
Note. Statistics are for drug and violent offenders for 1991–2002 for courthouses that randomly assigned
defendants to judges.
The coefficients of the first-stage regression provide further evidence that the
empirical model is correctly specified. Judge severity is persistent: judges whose
sentences are harsher by 1 month in other years give sentences that are harsher
by .2 month in the current year. Further, judges with prosecutorial experience
give sentences that are harsher by 3.3 months. For specifications with one en-
dogenous regressor, the rule of thumb is that the F-statistic should be at least
10 for weak identification not to be considered a problem (Staiger and Stock
1997). The F-statistics here are just above this threshold (see Table 3). I also
estimate all regressions by limited-information maximum-likelihood instrumen-
tal variables regression, since Stock and Yogo (2005) find this estimator to be
far superior to two-stage least squares regression with weak instruments. I obtain
the same results using both methods, and thus my results do not seem to be
subject to a weak-identification bias.
The dependent variable for the regressions at the bottom of Table 3 is the
probability that a defendant goes to trial. Perhaps because of measurement error,
the ordinary least squares coefficient of judge severity is close to zero. The two-
stage least squares estimates imply that a 1-month increase in sentence severity
increases the probability of a trial by .106 percentage point. I obtain similar but
more precise estimates when I rerun the regression with additional controls for
judge and offense.17
Prosecutorial experience could affect the likelihood of a trial independent of
its effect on average prison sentences. If this was the case, I would obtain different
coefficient estimates depending on whether I include prosecutorial experience
as an instrument. A robust test of overidentifying restrictions allows me to
determine whether judge severity is a valid instrument (Wooldridge 2002, p.
138). In all regressions, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying
17 Biographical information for the judges is from Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal
Judiciary: Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789–Present (http://www..fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/judges.html).
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Table 3
Estimates of the Effect of Judge Assignments on Trials
Judge
Severity 2R N
First-Stage
F-Statistic
Overridentifying
2x
Effect of judge severity on prison
sentences (months):
OLS .044 .136 71,147
(.051)
2SLS 1.039** .092 71,074 10.7** .126
(.037)
Effect of judge severity on trial rates (%):
OLS .024* .052 73,129
(.012)
2SLS .106 .048 73,065 10.9** .004
(.058)
2SLS with judge controls .138* .046 73,065 11.2** .099
(.056)
2SLS with offense controls .116* .061 73,065 11.2** .005
(.055)
Logit: marginal effect .122** 70,689
(.040)
Note. The sample consists of drug and violent offenders who were randomly assigned to judges. The
instruments for the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates are the average prison sentence for cases
assigned to the same judge in other years and an indicator variable for judge prosecutorial experience.
Additional judge controls are black, female, Baptist, and appointed by a Republican president. Offense
controls are offense-courthouse dummies and whether the case involves multiple defendants. In the logit
regression, judge severity is the average prison sentence for other cases assigned to the same judge in all
years. All regressions include courthouse-year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the judge
level. OLS p ordinary least squares.
 Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
restrictions (see Table 3). This supports the assumption that prosecutorial ex-
perience is a valid instrument for judge severity.
I estimate the probability of trial with a linear probability model because linear
models are more robust to misspecification. For instance, ordinary least squares
estimates are consistent in the presence of omitted variables that are uncorrelated
with the endogenous variables, while probit estimates are inconsistent (Yatchew
and Griliches 1985). Further, when facing measurement error in the regressor,
linear two-stage least squares estimates are consistent, while nonlinear two-stage
least squares estimates are inconsistent (Hausman 2001). Nonetheless, to provide
evidence of the robustness of my results, I estimate the probability of a trial
using a conditional logit regression.18 To reduce the bias due to measurement
error, I define judge severity as the average prison sentence for all other cases
assigned to the judge in all years. With this proxy for severity, I find that a 1-
18 Because of the courthouse-year fixed effects, I use conditional logit regression rather than logit
or probit regression.
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Table 4
Effect of Average Trial Sentences on Average Plea Sentences
Estimation
Average Trial
Sentences 2R N
OLS, all observations .028** .661 1,270
(.008)
OLS, more than five trials .059** .862 377
(.019)
Note. The sample consists of drug and violent offenders who were randomly assigned
to judges. In each regression, the unit of observation is the judge-year, the regressor is
the average prison sentence for cases that go to trial for a particular judge and year,
and the dependent variable is the average prison sentence for cases that are plead. All
regressions include courthouse-year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at
the judge level. OLS p ordinary least squares.
** Significant at the 1% level.
month increase in severity raises the probability of a trial by .122 percentage
point.
My measure of severity is the average prison sentence for all cases. This
definition is justified, since I expect longer plea sentences for defendants assigned
to judges with longer expected trial sentences. Specifically, suppose a defendant
assigned to a harsh judge expects a sentence with 1 additional month in prison
if the case goes to trial. Then, the defendant agrees to a plea bargain with 1 1
additional months in prison. Table 4 provides estimates of g ( ) obtainedˆg 1 0 g
by regressing the average prison sentence in a plea on the average prison sentence
in a trial, where the averages are computed for each judge and year.
These estimates of g are inconsistent because defendants are more likely to
go to trial when they are assigned to harsher judges. That is, harsher judges try
criminals who commit less serious offenses than defendants tried by more lenient
judges. As a result, the average prison sentence at trial underestimates the severity
of harsher judges. However, I showed in Section 4.2 that provides a lowergˆ
bound for the causal effect g. Thus, although I cannot infer the magnitude of
g, I can conclude from my estimates in Table 4 that . Consequently, theg 1 0
average prison sentence over all cases is a valid measure for the severity of judges
at trial.
6. Conclusion
Economic models provide explanations for bargaining failures, such as labor
negotiations that lead to strikes or litigation that goes to trial. Scholars have been
interested in providing empirical support for these models because they are based
on strong rationality and informational assumptions. However, Priest and Klein
(1984) pointed out that if parties are strategic, we should be cautious in drawing
inferences from subsets of negotiations, such as negotiations that lead to bar-
gaining failures or, in the context of litigation, cases that go to trial.
I have provided evidence consistent with strategic behavior by defendants and
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prosecutors. Specifically, I find that prison sentences agreed upon in plea bargains
depend on the assignment of the judge despite the fact that, in federal criminal
cases, judges are not allowed to be involved in settlement negotiation. Further,
I provide evidence that trial rates are increasing in the expected prison sentence
or, more generally, that the size of the stakes affects the likelihood of a bargaining
failure. While this is not the first study to provide this type of evidence, it is the
first to be able to instrument for the stakes in a way that is uncorrelated with
case selection.
A large literature has discussed the legitimacy of adjudicating criminal cases
through plea bargaining rather than trial. Plea bargaining gains legitimacy if
settlements largely reflect trial outcomes (Bibas 2004). However, there are several
obstacles in providing evidence that settlements reflect trial outcomes. First, for
defendants who plea-bargain, we do not know the sentence they would have
received if they had gone to trial. Second, we expect cases that are settled to
differ from cases that go to trial. Third, the relation between trial outcomes and
plea outcomes could occur through reverse causality; specifically, plea outcomes
affect the composition of cases that go to trial, which in turn affects the trial
prison sentences.
I have provided empirical evidence that the harshness of the judge at trial
explains the prison sentence in plea bargains. Thus, my empirical evidence sup-
ports the legitimacy of plea bargaining, since plea bargains reflect trial outcomes.
One may object that it is unjust that prison sentences agreed to in plea bargains
depend on judge assignments. However, as pointed out by Easterbrook (1983),
the inequities of plea-bargaining outcomes point to a deficiency in the trial
process rather than defects in the plea-bargaining process.
Appendix
Formal Model and Proofs
Bargaining Model
Denote by S the expected prison sentence at trial for a guilty suspect and by
aS the expected prison sentence at trial of an innocent suspect, where .a ! 1
Suspects know whether they are guilty, while the prosecutor believes that a
defendant is guilty with probability d. Part of the information on severity is
available before the indictment ( ), while the other part ( ) is revealed˜ ˜S w p S S
after the indictment.
Figure A1 describes the sequencing of the game. The prosecutor first decides
whether to indict the suspect. If the prosecutor indicts the suspect, both learn
additional information about the severity of the punishment (w), and the pros-
ecutor makes a plea offer. If the plea offer is accepted, the case is settled by plea
bargain; if it is rejected, the case goes to trial.
The utility function of the suspect is decreasing in the length of the prison
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sentence and the costs incurred in a trial or plea agreement. Specifically, if I
denote the prison sentence received at trial, the prison sentence received in a
plea agreement, the trial costs, and the plea agreement costs by x, y, , andDT
, respectively, the utility function of the suspect isDA
Dx T if the case is settled through trial
D DU p y A if the case is settled through plea agreement{0 if the suspect is not indicted.
The utility function of the prosecutor is increasing in the prison sentence that
a guilty defendant receives, decreasing in the prison sentence that an innocent
defendant receives, and decreasing in the costs incurred in a trial and in a plea
agreement. Specifically, if I denote trial and plea costs by and ,P PT ≥ 0 A ≥ 0
the utility function for the prosecutor is
Pgx T if the case is settled through trial and the defendant is guilty
PgyA if the case is settled through plea and the defendant is guilty
P PU p lx T if the case is settled through trial and the defendant is innocent
PlyA if the case is settled through plea and the defendant is innocent{
0 if the suspect is not indicted.
To simplify the analysis, I make the following restrictions on the parameters.
Assumption A1. Let andD D PS p (T  A ) A /a[dg (1 d)l] S p
. Then,P D D P(1 d)[T  (T  A )l A ]/d(1 a)g
i) ,d 1 l/(g l)
ii) , , andD D P PT ≥ A ≥ 0 T 1 A 1 0
iii) and .PEw p 0 FvF ! max{S S, A }
Proposition A1. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game,
i) if , the prosecutor declines to indict the suspect,˜S ! S
ii) if and , the expected prison sentence is aS, and the probability˜S 1 S S ! S
of a trial is 0, and
iii) if and , the expected prison sentence is , and the˜S 1 S S 1 S dS (1 d)aS
probability of a trial is .1 d
Proof. I first consider the optimal plea offer. Because of the trial costs, the
prosecutor never makes a settlement offer that all defendants reject. Thus, the
prosecutor can dismiss a case, make a plea offer that all defendants accept
(pooling equilibrium), or make an offer that only guilty defendants accept (sep-
arating equilibrium). In a pooling equilibrium, the prosecutor offers a plea of
, obtains an expected prison sentence ofD D D DaS T  A aS (T  A )
, and has a payoff ofD Dd(T  A )
D D P(aS T  A )[dg (1 d)l] A .
In a separating equilibrium, the prosecutor offers a plea of , obtainsD DS T  A
an expected prison sentence of , and has a payoff ofdS (1 d)aS
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Figure A1. Disposition of criminal suspects
D D P Pd[(S T  A )g A ] (1 d)(aSl T ).
Therefore, the separating equilibrium gives the prosecutor a higher payoff when
P D D P(1 d)[T  (T  A )l A ]
S 1 p S.
d(1 a)g
Finally, note that the expected payoff in a separating equilibrium is nonnegative
when .S ≥ S
Next, I consider the decision of whether or not to decline prosecution. First,
consider the case in which . Note that the prosecutor can guarantee a˜S ≥ S
nonnegative payoff by indicting and then selecting the pooling equilibrium.
Therefore, when , the prosecutor decides to indict. Second, consider the˜S ≥ S
case in which . By assumption A1.iii, if the prosecutor indicts, he or she˜S ! S
selects a pooling equilibrium that gives a negative payoff. Therefore, the pros-
ecutor decides not to indict. Q.E.D.
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Characterizations of Ordered Distributions
Lemma A1. Let X be a random variable with density . Consider theg(X; o)
following conditions:
a) for all , there is a probability space and random variables′o 1 o (Q, A, P)
and with densities and such that .′ ′ ′Z (q) Z(q) g(Z; o) g(Z; o ) Z ≥ Z
b) For all a, , .′ ′o 1 o Pr(X ≥ a; o ) ≥ Pr(X ≥ a; o)
c) For all increasing functions f, , .′o 1 o E f(X) ≥ E f(X)′o o
Then conditions a, b, and c above are equivalent. Further, conditions a, b,
and c hold if g satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property.
Proof. See Lehmann (1955). Q.E.D.
Example A1. In my plea-bargaining model, .˜Z p X p S p u o
Lemma A2. Let X be a random variable with density . Suppose forg(X; o)
all intervals , . Then, for all′(a, b) E[X; o , X  (a, b)] ≥ E[X; o, X  (a, b)]
increasing functions f, .′E f(X) ≥ E f(X)o o
Proof. This follows from the definition of an integral as the limit of step
functions. Q.E.D.
Lemma A3. Let X be a random variable with density . The density gg(X; o)
satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property if and only if for all intervals
, .′(a, b) E[X; o , X  (a, b)] ≥ E[X; o, X  (a, b)]
Proof. See Whitt (1980). Q.E.D.
Definition A1. A random variable X depending on a real parameter o with
density satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property if for ,′g(X; o) o 1 o
,′X 1 X
′ ′ ′g(X ; o ) g(X; o )≥ .
g(X; o) g(X; o)
Note that when g is differentiable, the definition of the monotone likelihood
ratio property is equivalent to
2 log g(X; o) ≥ 0.
Xo
Example A2. Suppose that u has a normal density with mean m and variance
. Then satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property since2 ˜j f
2 ˜ ˜ log f(S; o) m o
p 2 1 0.
4˜S o j
Lemma A4. Let and be random variables with density and˜ ˜ ˜X X p X w g
g, and assume that X and w are independent. The density h satisfies the monotone
likelihood ratio property if satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property.g˜
This content downloaded from 128.42.202.150 on Thu, 16 May 2013 12:15:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Punishment Severity 589
Proof. Let and . Then, by lemma A1, for any w,′ ′o 1 o S 1 S
˜ ˜E[X, o, w, X  (a, b)] p E[X, o, X  (a w, b w)] w
′
˜ ˜≥ E[X, o , X  (a w, b w)] w
′≥ E[X, o , w, X  (a, b)].
Therefore, , and by lemma A1, f satisfies′E[X, o, X  (a, b)] ≥ E[X, o , X  (a, b)]
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Q.E.D.
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